The UK Continues to Expand Its Controls on Emerging Technologies

On 11 March 2025, the Department for Business and Trade through the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), issued a notice to exporters providing advance notice of updates to the UK Strategic Export Control Lists, which are expected to be implemented in Spring 2025.

The Strategic Export Control Lists specify goods, software and technology that are subject to export controls because of their potential dual-use and military capabilities. The items listed in the Strategic Export Control Lists reflect changes agreed pursuant to international frameworks to which the UK is a member, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group.

Controls discussed and agreed under these international frameworks typically signal the types of concerns that are top of mind for countries. By way of example, in the past year, the UK and U.S. have implemented amendments to tighten controls on semiconductors, advanced computing and quantum technologies – amongst other items. These amendments, particularly from the U.S. side, have been linked to a growing concern around China’s access to such technologies as part of its military modernization and the growing use of export controls as a tool to protect national security.

UK Control List Updates

The amendments previewed in the ECJU’s latest notice to exporters include the following key changes:

• Amendments to reflect changes published in the control lists on the Wassenaar Arrangement website on 5 December 2024, as adopted into UK legislation – these include changes to the following control list entries:
  • Category 1 (special materials and related equipment): 1C002 and 1C005;
  • Category 3 (electronics): 3A002 and 3C005;
  • Category 5 (telecommunications and “information security”): 5A001, 5E001 and 5A002;
  • Category 6 (sensors and lasers): 6A005;
  • Category 8 (marine): 8A001 and 8A002;
  • Category 9 (aerospace and propulsion): 9A004, 9B and 9E003;
  • UK Military List: ML10 ("Aircraft", "lighter-than-air vehicles", "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" ("UAVs"), aero-engines and "aircraft" and equipment, related goods, and components specially designed or modified for military use).
• Editorial amendments to Technical Notes and definitions in certain entries, including an amendment to the definition of ‘spacecraft’ resulting in new definitions for ‘satellite’, ‘space probe’ and ‘space vehicle’.
• Amendments in line with changes agreed under the guidelines on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) website, which include changes to following control list entries:
  • Category 0 (nuclear materials, facilities and equipment): 0B004a and 0B004b;
  • Category 1 (special materials and related equipment): 1A202, 1A225 and 1B228;
  • Category 6 (sensors and lasers): 6A225.
• Amendments in line with changes agreed under the Australia Group in Category 2 (materials processing): 2B352.
• Amendments to the technical parameters of the existing control under PL9013a4 aimed at high-end digital processing integrated circuits (ICs) most suitable for AI training.

The incoming amendments signal that controls on semiconductor related items and emerging technologies continue to be a priority for the UK.  

Growing Ineffectiveness of the Multilateral Structure

While certain of these changes have been agreed under international frameworks, the key consensus-based regimes (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement) are experiencing growing disfunction.

Russia is a core member of most of the multilateral review systems around which the UK, the U.S. and other countries have built their export control system. The consensus-based approach of the regimes requires that all members agree to any change.  

However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has consistently vetoed additions to the control list at the multilateral level. Due to this absence of coordination among members, the UK, U.S., and other partner countries (the so-called “Wassenaar Minus One” group) have started to develop harmonized controls that previously would have been agreed under the Wassenaar Arrangement. Although the existing multilateral regimes do not contemplate or account for any type of country-specific strategic controls, with the Wassenaar Arrangement procedures in standstill (and expelling Russia posing significant challenges), we expect that we will continue to see the proliferation of national export controls, either by unilateral and national action or in other multilateral formats (e.g., through the “Wassenaar Minus One” group).

Increased Focus on National Controls

Accordingly, we are increasingly seeing countries implement their own national controls either independently or where such controls are agreed amongst a collection of like-minded countries. In April 2024 we saw the UK (along with a group of like-minded countries) adopt amendments to the Export Control Order 2008 to implement additional controls on emerging technologies, including the introduction of three new entries: PL9013 (semiconductor technologies, (production) equipment and materials), PL9014 (quantum computing technologies) and PL9015 (additive manufacturing technologies).

On the EU side, a number of individual Member States have also adopted their own controls pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 821/2021 (the EU Dual-Use Regulation) which empowers EU Member States to unilaterally adopt controls “for reasons of public security, including the preventing of acts of terrorism, or for human rights considerations”. For example, relying on Article 9(1) of the EU Dual-Use Regulation: (i) France, in February 2024, imposed national controls on goods and technologies associated with quantum computer and advanced electronic components/semiconductors and (ii) in June 2023, the Netherlands introduced a license requirement for the export of certain semiconductor production equipment.

Future Outlook

While we are seeing individual countries unilaterally adopt export controls as a result of paralysis of the Wassenaar Arrangement, this does not necessarily translate into divergence or fragmentation of export controls. Rather, it appears that like-minded countries are trying to move in tandem by implementing national controls on emerging technologies.

However, stepping outside of the confines of the Wassenaar Arrangement has allowed countries to adopt controls that go beyond what could possibly be agreed by consensus. For example, the controls on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items issued by the U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) in December 2024 significantly expanded U.S. export controls. Such sweeping restrictions would have been difficult to pass through the Wassenaar protocols. While nowhere near as extensive, non-U.S. export control regimes are not immune from U.S. influence. For example, in 2023 the U.S. courted the Netherlands and Japan to impose controls on sales of semiconductor related technology to China as part of its efforts to curb China’s access to Western technology.

Thus, whilst the implementation of these plurilateral controls is not uniform across international export control authorities, as we have observed in the past few years, we expect to continue to see countries impose and strengthen controls on emerging technologies, such as semiconductors, quantum computing and artificial intelligence. In particular, we expect to see increased unilateral action, as well as export controls agreed amongst a subset of countries, largely as a result of the paralysis of the Wassenaar Arrangement.